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COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION AT SEA:
AN INSURANCF, APPROACH
Torrey Canyon has come to represent the ultimate in oil spill
devastation. The accidental breakup of this jumbo-sized 118,000
deadweight (dwt.) ton tanker off the coast of southern England
caused more than 80,000 tons of crude oil to be spilled into the water
between France and England.1 The sums expended by the British
and French governments to clean up the oil amounted to more than
$16 million.2  However, the actual damages were many times
greater than $16 million when private property damage, injury to
marine organisms, and loss of fishing are considered. Despite the
scope of the damage, both in terms of cleanup costs and private
property damage, Union Oil and its insurers were able to settle
their liability for only $7.2 million.3 Most of the damage was there-
fore borne by the victims of the catastrophe.
Union Oil carried liability insurance protecting it4 against claims
by third parties in the approximate amount of $4.5 million.5 With
possible damages running into the tens of millions of dollars, the
$4.5 million coverage appeared to be inadequate to fully protect the
insured. However, based on a peculiarity within the shipping in-
dustry whereby a shipowner is given the right to limit his liability
for damages to third parties, a vessel owner's legal liability has
traditionally been much lower than the actual damages. For ex-
ample, at the time of the breakup of the Torrey Canyon, Union
Oil could have limited its total liability under British law to only
$2.8 million.6 Under the 1957 Brussels Convention, the liability of
1. E. CowA-, Om. AxD WATER: THE ToRREv CANYON DISASTER 11 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as CowAN].
2. Id. at 195, 200.
3. Note, Liability for Oil Pollution Clean Up and the Water Quality Im-
provement Act of 1970, 55 ConNmL L. REv. 973, 982 (1970).
4. The record owner of the Torrey Canyon, Barracuda Corporation, was
the technical defendant. However, Barracuda had an indemnity agreement
with Union Oil Co., leaving the latter liable for the occurrence. See CowAw,
supra note 1, at 213.
5. See CowAN, supra note 1, at 214.
6. Under the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Em.z. 2, c.
62, liability was limited to $58 per net registered ton. With the Torrey Can-
April 197$ Vol. 12 No. 3
the Torrey Canyon shipowners could have been limited to $3.6 mil-
lion.7 Under American law,8 liability could have been limited to
fifty dollars, since American limits have been based on the value
of the ship and cargo after the occurrence, and a fifty-dollar lifeboat
was all that was left of the $16.5 million supertanker after its break-
up. As with the Torrey Canyon, the legal limits of liability have
often proved beneficial to the shipowners at the expense of coastal
countries and populations.
Torrey Canyon thus represents more than oil spill destruction.
The ship's insurance situation, aided by the limitation of liability
principle, exemplifies the grave inadequacy of protection and com-
pensation for potential victims of tanker oil spills.
This comment will first discuss the potential damages aspect of
oil spills. Then, the various limits of liability now existing will be
presented, followed by a discussion of tanker indemnity insurance.
Against this background, suggestions for a more equitable distri-
bution of the risks of oil pollution from tankers will be made.
I. PoTENTIAL OmL DisASmas
In order to capitalize on the higher profit margins afforded by
transporting oil in larger ships,9 the shipping industry has greatly
increased the size of tankers and their capacity for carrying oil in
the last decade. 10 Concomitant with this trend has been the in-
crease in cleanup costs for oil spills." Inflation and the prohibition
Von's net registered tonnage of 48,477, liability would be limited to approxi-
mately $2.8 million.
7. International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability
for Owners of Seagoing Ships, Brussels, Oct. 10, 1957 [hereinafter cited as
1957 Brussels Convention], reprinted in GA BENEDICT, AnvmmRLTY 634, (7th
ed. (rev.) A. Knauth and C. Knauth 1969).
8. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1966); see also notes 22-29 and accompanying text,
infra.
9. Basically, profit margins increase as the size of the ship increases.
Thus, it is less expensive to operate one 200,000 dwt. ton tanker than two
100,000 dwt. ton tankers. See CowAN, supra note 1, at 13-16.
10. The Torrey Canyon was approximately 118,000 dwt. tons and was
considered to be one of the three or four largest tankers in the world in
1967. In 1972, forty-two tankers of 240,000 dwt. tons and larger were in
use, seven of those being over 300,000 dwt. tons. In its 1974 third quarter
report, Texaco announced the launching of its second 500,000 dwt. ton
tanker. Japan had previously announced its plans to build tankers as large
as 800,000 and one million dwt. tons. See, e.g., Comment, Post Torrey Can-
yon: Toward a New Solution to the Problem of Traumatic Oil Spillage,
2 CoNN. L. REv. 632 (1970); Note, Toward a State Remedy for Oil Spill
Damages: An Insurance Approach, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 n.3 (1972).
11. Using the cost of cleanup figures which applied to the Torrey Can-
yon-$16,000,000/80,000 or $200 per dwt. ton-the cleanup costs of a
240,000 dwt. ton tanker discharging a full 1oad of cargo would be $48 mil-
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of cheap chemicals traditionally used as oil dispersants have caused
the per-ton cleanup cost to rise sharply in the past few years.12
Notwithstanding the sizable costs involved in cleanup operations,
liability for other types of damages often makes cleanup costs seem
miniscule. Other recoverable damages might include injury to pri-
vate, beach-front property, loss of profits to fishermen caused by
the destruction of fish or the inability of the fishermen to navigate
in oil-spoiled waters,'3 loss of profits to other businesses relying
on an oil-free beach or ocean,14 and loss of such riparian rights as
swimming, boating, and picnicking.'5
One recent example of the huge amount of damages involved be-
yond cleanup costs was a recent spill in Maine from an oil facility
into Seasport Harbor.'8 The Attorney General of Maine brought a
seventy million dollar damage suit against National Services Cor-
poration, which operated the oil facility for the United States Air
Force. The damages included $10 million for injury to the tidal
waters, $10 million for future injury before corrective measures
could have any effect, and $5 million for damages which will con-
tinue indefinitely as a result of the devastation of the clam industry
in the harbor and to other marine life. The alleged $70 million
in damages was caused by approximately 32 dwt. tons of fuel oil.l'r
Using the Torrey Canyon cleanup figures of $200 per dwt. ton of
oil, the cost to clean up the spill would have been only $6,400. This
amounts to only a fraction of one percent of the total alleged dam-
ages.' 8 If it can be assumed that the same percentage of cleanup
costs to overall damages might exist in a larger oil spill, 19 the poten-
lion; the cleanup costs of a 500,000 dwt. ton supertanker would be $100
million. Cf. note 123 and accompanying text, infra.
12. See notes 121-24 and accompanying text, infra.
13. See, e.g., 5 Env. Rep. 248 (1974); cf. 5 Env. Rep. 158-78 (1974).
14. Id.
15. See Petition of New Jersey Barging Co., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
16. 5 Env. Rep. 184, 184-85 (1974).
17. Id. at 185. One dwt. ton of oil is equal to approximately .55 gross
registered tons of oil, or approximately 7.5 barrels of oil, or approximately
315 gallons of oil.
18. At $200 per dwt. ton, the computation is as follows: 200 x 32/
70,000,000 = 64/70,000 - .000009 - 9/10,000 of one percent.
19. Such a low percentage of cleanup costs to overall damages could also
exist in very large oil spills if, for example, resort beaches were involved.
Imagine the huge amount of lost profits if a 200,000 dwt. ton tanker dis-
tial liability becomes astronomical. However, because of a ship-
owner's right to limit his liability, a great amount of damage can
occur without remedy to the injured person.20
II. LimiTATIoN OF LiLimIn
The policy of allowing shipowners to limit their liability to third
persons injured as a result of negligence centers on the idea of en-
couraging investment in a risky and hazardous business. 21 Pre-
sumably, fewer people would take the risks involved in owning and
operating a vessel if they would also be held to unlimited liability
for the negligence of the charterer or crew.
In the United States, the limitation of liability was first granted
to shipowners by the Limited Liability Act of 1851.22 The owner
or charterer of a vessel could limit his liability to the value of his
interest in the ship and cargo. However, the privilege would be
lost where the shipowner had knowledge or privity of substandard
conditions and failed to take any action to correct the problem. For
example, if the shipowner knew of the unseaworthiness of his vessel
and still allowed it to depart, or if the spill could be traced to any
willfulness on the part of the owner, he would be denied the lia-
bility limit and would be fully responsible for any ensuing damage.
The advantage of limited liability in the absence of privity or
knowledge was greatly enhanced by an I871 Supreme Court case2 3
which held that liability could be limited to the value of the ship-
charged its cargo into the waters off Miami Beach during the peak season,
thereby closing the beaches.
20. Pollution caused by the accidental breakup of supertankers is only
one source of oil pollution of the seas. Of the estimated total of 1.4 million
tons of oil discharged into the seas each year, 70% is caused by tank
cleaning operations; bilge pumping leaks and bunkering spills account for
7%; terminal facilities cause the discharge of approximately 5%; and
tanker accidents account for the remaining 18%. See 5 Env. Rep. 184
(1974).
The insurance factor for intentional pollution by tankers is insignificant.
Most shipowners and oil companies carry insurance with a deductible
amount far in excess of the fines or small compensation claims involved
in this type of pollution. Also, most liability insurance policies exclude
coverage for intentional acts of the insured.
The civil liability aspects of intentional oil pollution are also insignificant
when compared to negligent oil pollution. Discharges caused by cleaning
operations are presumably controlled to some extent; the damage resulting
from such planned discharges is usually kept to a minimum based on the
shipowner's interest in reducing his liability for any possible damage.
21. Hearings on S.7 and S.544 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 124 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
22. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, §§ 3, 9 STAT. 635; 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1966).
23. Norwich Company v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
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owner's interest in the ship and cargo after the accident had oc-
curred, rather than before. Thus, following the Torrey Canyon dis-
aster, the American shipowners were allowed to file a petition to
limit their liability to fifty dollars, the value of the one remaining
lifeboat.
24
Since insurers only become liable for those amounts which their
insured becomes legally liable to pay, shipowners' limited liability
has meant low premiums and broad coverage. For over one hun-
dred years, there was no ceiling written into liability policies for
the reason that the value of the vessel set the upper limit of the
insurance contract.25 However, recent changes in the limitation of
liability, especially with regard to oil polluition damage, have had
a sobering effect on insurers as well as shipowners.
The first change in legislation modifying the statutory right to
limit liability was a 1966 amendment to the Oil Pollution Act of
1924.26 The 1966 amendment provided that a shipowner had to im-
mediately remove any oil intentionally discharged upon navigable
water regardless of the cleanuph costs and his limited liability
rights. If he failed to do so, the Secretary of the Interior was em-
powered to remove the oil and charge the cost to the shipowner.
However, there would be no liability at all if the discharge was
caused by simple negligence or collision with another vessel.
2 7
Since insurance contracts generally exclude coverage for inten-
tional acts by the insured, the 1966 amendment meant that liability
for a shipowner's intentional discharge of oil would be borne en-
tirely by the shipowner himself.
The 1966 amendment was followed by -the 1970 Water Quality Im-
provement Act.28 As noted, the 1,966 amendment assessed liability
against the shipowner only if the oil discharge was willful or inten-
tional. The 1970 act, however, assesses liability for both negligent
and intentional oil discharges. No limitation of liability is applic-
24. CowAN, supra note 1, at 202.
25. See Healy, Water Pollution Liability from an Insurance Standpoint,
9 HousTO K L. REv. 662, 663-4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Healy].
26. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, as amended, Act of Nov.
3, 1966, Pub. I. No. 89-753, § 211 (a), 80 Stat. 1252 (repealed 1970).
27. Id.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1970). The 1970 Water Quality Improve-
ment Act was incorporated into the broader Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 et seq. (Supp. 1973). Since the relevant
provisions of both statutes are identical, they will be used interchangeably.
able in cases of willful conduct. In all other cases, the shipowner
can limit his liability for cleanup costs to a total of fourteen million
dollars or one hundred dollars per gross registered ton, whichever
is less. Consequently, liability insurance protection against oil pol-
lution after 1970 was no longer written without a ceiling. Limits
of up to fourteen million dollars were included in virtually all oil
pollution endorsements immediately after the 1970 act went into
effect.
29
Changes in the limitation of liability for shipowners using United
States waters coincided with changes in such limitations throughout
the world. The first international convention to adopt limits of
liability for discharges of oil was the 1957 Brussels Convention on
the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability.30 The limits established
by the Convention were sixty-seven dollars per gross registered
ton.31 In an apparent attempt to forestall even higher limits, the
shipping industry, the American Merchant Marine Institute, the
American Bar Association, and the Maritime Law Association
lobbied on behalf of adoption of the Convention by the United
States.3 2  Congress failed to ratify the Convention, however, and
by the time it came into force among those who did ratify it,
3 3
proposals for higher limits were already under consideration
throughout the world.
Such proposals were a direct result of the Torrey Canyon incident
in 1967.34 As noted, the Torrey Canyon generated approximately
sixteen million dollars in cleanup costs with the discharge of eighty
thousand tons of oil. 5 The per-gross registered ton amount of
cleanup costs was in excess of $250.36 These figures, when com-
pared to the inadequate limits of liability appearing in the 1957
Brussels Convention, caused sufficient consternation among the sig-
natories of that Convention and other nations to spark interest in
another conference to revise such limits.
1969 Civil Liability Convention
An increase in the limits of the 1957 Brussels Convention was
29. Healy, supra note 25, at 664.
30. 1957 Brussels Convention, supra note 7.
31. Id. art. 3 (1) (a).
32. 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 125.
33. The convention finally came into force in 1968 when Israel became
the thirteenth state to ratify the treaty.
34. See, e.g., Daud, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Further
Comment on the Civil Liability and Compensation Fund Conventions, 4 J.
MuIn= L. & Com. 525, 526 (1973).
35. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text, supra.
36. The per-deadweight ton amount of damage was in the vicinity of two
hundred dollars. See note 17, supra, for conversion figures.
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the primary focus of the draft convention entitled the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,37 con-
vened in Brussels in 1969. The Convention finally adopted limits
of approximately $134.40 per gross registered ton and a total lia-
bility of approximately $14,112,000,38 more than double the limits
of the 1957 Brussels Convention.
Another salient feature of the draft convention was that the basis
of liability adopted was one of strict liability,39 in accord with the
Water Quality Improvement Act.40 The owner can escape liability
only if he can prove that the pollution damage resulted from an
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, an act of God, an act
or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party,
or the ". . . negligence or other wrongful aot of any Government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function."41
If the shipowner is held liable, he can only limit his liability to
the prescribed amounts if the pollution is not the result of the own-
er's actual fault or knowledge.42 This provision concurs with the
Water Quality Improvement Act, which also disallows a limited lia-
bility when the shipowner has knowledge or is personally at fault.
43
As noted, most insurance agreements exclude coverage for inten-
tional acts; therefore, if the shipowner is personally at fault, he
might lose not only his right to limit his liability, but also his in-
surance coverage.
37. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Opened for Signature, Nov. 29, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability
Convention], reprinted in L. NORDQUIST, NEw DmECTcoNs IN THE LAW OF
= SEA, DocumwITs II 602-10 (1973 [hereinafter cited as NoRDQUIST];
for a report of the Civil Liability Convention, see Healy, The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1 J. M1ViTnrr
L. & COM. 317 (1970).
38. Civil Liability Convention, art. V(1). The figures of $134.40 and
$14,112,000 are based on the exchange rate in existence in 1969. According
to the October 8, 1974, edition of the Wall Street Journal, at 33, the present
exchange rate is .2104 American dollars for one French franc. Applying
this to the convention limits would mean a per-gross registered ton limit
of $420.80 and a maximum liability of $44,184,000.
39. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 37, art. I11(1).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1970).
41. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 37, art. 111(2) (a), (b), (c),
(3).
42. Id. art. V(2).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1970).
A major element of the Civil Liability Convention which distin-
guishes it from the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 is that
liability extends to private damage claims and not just to cleanup
costs.44 Thus, a private party suffering property damage could re-
cover from the fund deposited into the applicable court by a ship..
owner or insurer pursuant to the Civil Liability Convention. How-
ever, only the U.S. Government can recover-and only for cleanup
costs-from a like fund established pursuant to the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970.
4 5
International Compensation Fund
Complementing the Civil Liability Convention was the 1971 draft
convention entitled the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage.4 0 The
purposes for establishing the fund are:
a) to provide compensation for pollution damage to the extent
that the protection afforded by the Liability Convention is inade-
quate;
b) to give relief to shipowners in respect of the additional finan-
cial burden imposed on them by the Liability Convention, such
relief being subject to conditions designed to ensure compliance
with safety at sea and other conventions. 47
Among the pollution damage claims which the International Com-
pensation Fund would cover would be: 1) damages resulting from
acts of God;48 2) damages caused by a shipowner who was finan-
cially incapable of meeting his responsibility; 49 and 3) occurrences
where total damages resulting from the spill exceed the shipowner's
limit of liability as prescribed in the Liability Convention, up to
a maximum recovery of thirty million dollars.50
However, the coverage is restricted in several ways. Payouts are
not made for oil damage resulting from an act of war.5 1 Also, a
claimant must prove that the oil was discharged by a ship, since
discharges from in-place facilities are beyond the scope of the
44. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 37, art. M(1).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1970).
46. International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, Opened for Signature, December 18, 1971,
[hereinafter cited as International Compensation ;Fund], reprinted in
NORDQuiST, supra note 37, at 611.
47. Id. art. 2(1) (a), (b).
48. Civil Liability Convention, supra note 37, art. I1(2) (a).
49. International Compensation Fund, supra note 46, art. 4(1) (b). This
situation could arise when, for example, the shipowner is sailing under a
non-contracting state's flag, and is not required to maintain insurance un-
der the laws of that country.
50. Id. art. 4(4) (a).
51. Id. art. 4(2) (a).
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Fund.52 This requirement may be particularly onerous in light of
the extreme difficulty in determining which ship, if any, was re-
sponsible for a particular discharge, especially in areas of well-
travelled sea lanes.
53
A major aspect of the draft convention is that shipowners may,
under certain circumstances, seek indemnification from the Fund
for damages they have already paid out.54 In effect, this provision
means that shipowners will be sharing liability for oil pollution
with the oil companies, since the Fund is made up exclusively of
contributions from cargo owners.55
The following example shows how both conventions are supposed
to work. Assume that a 200,000 dwt. ton tanker accidentally dis-
charges its cargo, generating cleanup costs of $20 million and pri-
vate property claims of $40 million for a total of $60 million. If
the country suffering the damage and the flag-state of the tanker
are both contracting states of the conventions, -the case will prob-
ably be retained by the victim-state.56 In order to limit his lia-
bility pursuant to the Civil Liability Convention, the shipowner will
deposit into court a certificate of insurance in the amount of his
maximum liability.5 The shipowner is thereby relieved of all fur-
ther responsibility in the case, and the claimants will litigate their
claims directly against the insurer.58 Since the total amount of
claims exceeds fourteen million dollars, claimants may file for reim-
bursement from the International Compensation Fund. There is
52. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
53. See, eg., Hunter, The Proposed International Compensation Fund of
Oil Pollution Damage, 4 J. MAREiE L. & Com. 117, 124 (1972).
54. International Compensation Fund, supra note 46, art. 5.
55. Article 10 of the International Compensation Fund provides that con-
tributions are to be made by all persons or companies who receive in ex-
cess of 150,000 tons of oil a year if the oil is carried by sea to the ports
of the contracting state. Contracting states are bound to ensure any obliga-
tion for contributions owed by one of its citizens. Also, each state must
supply a list of persons who have received enough oil to make them liable
for contributions. The Fund, once it becomes operative, will cover damages
up to thirty million dollars per incident.
56. Contracting states waive their right to adjudicate claims involving
ships sailing under their flag. Plaintiffs are given the choice of bringing
the action either in the jurisdiction of the country where the damage occurs
or in the jurisdiction of the flag state. See Civil Liability Convention, supra
note 37, art. IX(1).
57. Id. art. V(3).
58. Id. art. V.1(8).
no ranking of claims in either the Civil Liability Convention or the
International Compensation Fund, as all victims share proportion-
ately in the recovery.
Thus, the claimants could recover $14.1 million pursuant to the
Civil Liability Convention and $15.9 million 0 from the Inter-
national Compensation Fund. The remaining $30 million of dam-
ages would go uncompensated. Claimants could not litigate further
on the basis that the shipowner's U.S. limits-value of the vessel
and cargo after the accident-had not as yet been involved, since
recovery pursuant to the conventions relieves the shipowner of any
further liability.
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil
Pollution60. (TOVALOP)
TOVALOP represents a commendable effort on the part of tanker
owners and oil companies to deal with the problem of tanker pollu-
tion. The agreement was reached prior to the Civil Liability Con-
vention, and TOVALOP became operational in January, 1969. Bas-
ically, the agreement provides that the participating shipowners
and bareboat charterers61 will provide a source of recovery for na-
tional governments who have expended money in removing oil
caused by the negligent discharge of a participating tanker."" No
recovery is allowed for private parties or for any property damage.
A government's claim against a participating owner must be based
on fault of the tanker owner, though the burden of proof is put
on the defendant. 63 Thus, if a government files a claim against
a member of TOVALOP for expenses in removing oil allegedly
spilled by the tanker, the tanker owner must disprove negligence
in order to defeat the claim. A tanker owner's liability is limited
by the agreement to one hundred dollars per gross registered ton
or ten million dollars maximum, whichever is the lesser.0 4 The
government's claim for cleanup costs, if accepted and paid pursuant
to the terms of TOVALOP, precludes further recovery by the gov-
ernment in any other forum. 5
59. International Compensation Fund, supra note 46, art. 4(4) (a).
60. The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for
Oil Pollution [hereinafter cited as TOVALOP], is reprinted in NoRDQiusT,
supra note 37, at 641.
61. A bareboat charterer is a charterer who takes on the added responsi-
bility of finding a crew and navigating the tanker at his own expense.
62. TOVALOP preamble, NoRDQTrisT, supra note 37, at 641.
63. Id. art. IV(B).
64. Id. art. VI(A).
65. Id. art. VII(F).
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Over 90% of the tanker industry participates in TOVALOP and
carries insurance with TOVALOP's representative, the Interna-
tional Tanker Indemnity Association, Ltd. (I.T.I.A.).66 When a
claim does arise from a negligent discharge, liability is placed solely
on the participating owner and I.T.I.A. 67 Other participating mem-
bers do not become liable to the victim-state. This precludes a gov-
ernment from seizing a participating member's ship in order to sat-
isfy a claim against another participating tanker which had polluted
the claimant's waters.68
A significant provision of TOVALOP is that the tanker owner
is able to recover monies which he has spent in removing any dis-
charged oil from the group's insurer.69 Further, he can recover for
any cleanup expenses even though he was not legally liable for the
spill. 7 Thus, recovery from I.T.I.A. by a government is predicated
on the negligence of the tanker owner; whereas, recovery by the
tanker owner is allowed in any case of a discharge from his tanker,
regardless of legal liability. Presumably, this provision acts as an
incentive to promote quick cleanup, thereby minimizing damages
in the long run.
A major criticism of TOVALOP was that it only provides com-
pensation for a government's cleanup expenses. 71 Private property
owners who suffer oil pollution damage are excluded from recovery.
In a sense, the criticism was unfair, since the members of TOVA-
LOP were not obligated to provide any source of reimbursement
for pollution damage, much less to private property owners. How-
ever, to provide a more complete program of recovery, the oil in-
dustry announced in 1971 an interim project to compensate private
victims of oil spills.
66. See Becker, Vehicles for Reimbursement of Oil Pollution Damage, 9
HousToN L. REv. 669 (1972).
67. TOVALOP, supra note 60, art. IV (A).
68. This misfortune occurred to the Torrey Canyon's sister ship, the Lake
Palourde. While docking in Singapore approximately four months after the
devastating oil spill, the Lake Palourde was seized by British authorities
to provide another possible source of compensation for damages done by
the Torrey Canyon. See CowAN, supra note 1, at 193-203.
69. TOVALOP, supra note 60, art. V.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Swan, International and National Approaches to Oil Pollu-
tion Responsibility: An Emerging Regime for a Global Problem, 50 ORE.
L. REv. 504 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Swan].
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution72 (CRISTAL)
CRISTAL went into effect on April 1, 1971. It operates in much
the same way as the International Compensation Fund, providing
a fund for victims who have been unable to obtain relief from other
sources. According to the terms of CRISTAL, it will terminate au-
tomatically upon adoption of the International Compensation
Fund.73 The reason is that both plans are funded from the same
source-the cargo owners. However, the International Compensa-
tion Fund has not as yet come into force, so CRISTAL remains the
sole international source of compensation for private damages from
oil pollution.
7 4
CRISTAL's fund is operated by a Bermuda corporation, the Oil
Companies Institute for Marine Pollution Compensation, Ltd.
Claims against the fund will be paid only if the oil damage resulted
from oil owned by one of the contracting oil companies. 75 In addi-
tion, recovery for a polluting incident is reduced by the amounts
which could have been recovered in any other forum.70 These pro-
visions greatly reduce the efficacy of CRISTAL, especially in cases
where cleanup costs are large, since the fund for the particular inci-
dent is reduced by the amount which the government can recover
under TOVALOP.
77
Despite the shortcomings of TOVALOP and CRISTAL, they are
nonetheless noteworthy in that: 1) they are the only currently op-
72. The Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution, [hereinafter cited as CRISTAL], is reprinted in NoRn-
QUIST, supra note 37, at 646.
73. CRISTAL, art. II(C) (1) (iii).
74. Since the Civil Liability Convention, supra note 37, is also not in
force, TOVALOP and CRISTAL represent the major operative international
schemes for oil pollution recovery.
75. CRISTAL, supra note 72, art. IV(A) (1), (2).
76. Id. art. IV(B). For example, assume that a 100,000 ton U.S.-flag
tanker negligently discharged oil into U.S. waters causing a governmental
cleanup expense of ten million dollars. Assume also that the tanker owner,
a member of TOVALOP, spent an additional six million dollars in his own
cleanup efforts. Then, assume that the ship and remaining oil had a value
of twenty million dollars. CRISTAL would not pay off on any private
claims because the amount to be deducted exceeds the thirty million dollars
per incident fund. TOVALOP would pay out ten million dollars to the gov-
ernment for its cleanup expense, and six million dollars to reimburse the
tanker owner for his expenses. This would leave fourteen million dollars
left to be claimed from CRISTAL. However, the limit of liability of the
shipowner under U.S. law is the value of the shipowner's interest in the
ship and the cargo after the occurrence, or twenty million dollars in this
case. This amount, added to the amounts paid out by TOVALOP, equals
thirty six million dollars, wiping out the CRISTAL fund by six million dol-
lars.
77. Id.
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erating international schemes for dealing with tanker oil pollution;
2) they were started by members of the oil and shipping industries
and not by any international governmental body; and 3) despite
criticism that the plans were forwarded in order to ". . placate eco-
logy-conscious legislators and to forestall, if not completely pre-
empt, more stringent liability schemes under national and interna-
tional law,"178 most claims, at least under TOVALOP, are fully set-
tled by the group insurer to the satisfaction of the claimant-govern-
ment.
III. INsuRiNG AGAINST TANmER Om POLLUTION
Insurers have excluded contamination or pollution damage from
coverage in the standard public liability policies protecting the av-
erage entrepreneur against suits by third persons. The typical ex-
clusion reads:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release,
or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemi
cals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contamin-
ants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water-
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden and accidental.79
A slightly different form of exclusion is used in liability policies
covering oil risks. The last clause is changed to read "whether or
not the event is sudden and accidental."80 It is necessary to delete
this exception regarding sudden and accidental discharges since oil
spills are more often than not sudden and accidental. Otherwise,
the exclusion would have little effect in restricting the coverage
offered. Protection against liability for oil pollution damage may
still be obtained by a buy-back endorsement, whereby the exclusion
is made inoperative.
Providing coverage against pollution is disfavored for at least two
reasons. First, the ability to insure against pollution could pre-
sumably act to lessen the incentive on the part of polluters to pre-
vent pollution. Apparently acting on this premise, the New York
78. Swan, supra note 71, at 516.
79. See Contamination or Pollution Exclusion, FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY
BULL., Casualty & Surety section, COP-i, 2 (May 1971) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as Fnu CAsuALTY & SURETY BULL.].
80. Id.
Legislature recently amended its insurance law to prevent the sale
of pollution insurance."'
Pollution insurance has also been disfavored by the insurance in-
dustry based on its general reluctance to accept exposure to liability
for risks of unknown dimensions. As more and more cases of pollu-
tion in general and oil spills in particular are reported, underwriters
will undoubtedly develop greater expertise in rating the particular
risks, and reluctance to underwrite pollution risks may fade. How-
ever, less than three years ago, the Insurance Rating Board pro-
posed that coverage for oil pollution be excluded from standard lia-
bility policies based on the fact -that data concerning costs involved
in indemnifying polluters was sorely lacking.8 2 The problems for
insurers were aptly expressed in the May, 1971 edition of Fire, Cas-
ualty, & Surety Bulletin:
[L] egal theories revolving around the problem [of pollution] are
in a state of flux. The spirit of the times seems to be "stop the
polluters" by almost any means-a dangerous time for any insurer
to accept the transfer of such a risk. Rating an exposure of such
unknown dimensions presents another problem.... The insured's
position as a "target" risk would have to be ascertained (in an
anti-war atmosphere, a munitions manufacturer is more apt to be
singled out for a pollution suit than is the maker of baby car-
riages); chances of the insured being lumped in a suit with all
similar concerns in his area because some of them are contributing
to pollution would have to be judged.8 3
Despite the reasons supporting the reluctance of insurers to ac-
cept a pollution risk, oil tankers have long been protected against
third party claims arising from oil pollution damage by the limit-
ations on a shipowner's liability. Since liability was always limited
by the shipowner's interest in the ship and cargo, insurers have
traditionally insured an oil tanker risk without a ceiling on cover-
age.
8 4
Most marine liability insurance is handled by the London Group
of Protection and Indemnity Associations and various worldwide
underwriters.8 5 The London Group consists of sixteen mutual pro-
tection and indemnity associations. Protection against oil pollution,
personal injury and death to members of the crew or third persons,
cargo loss or damage, and property damage are among the risks
covered.
8 6
81. N.Y. INS. LAw § 46 SuBD. 13, 14 (McKinney supp. 1973).
82. See, e.g., McGeough, The Applicability of Liability Insurance Cover-
age to Actions Involving Environmental Damage, 1971 ABA SECTIoN OF
INs., NEG., AND Coup. LAw PROCEEDINGS, 312, 318.
83. F=RE, CAsUALTY & SuETY BULL., supra note 79, at COP 3.
84. See Healy, supra note 25, at 663.
85. Id. at 662-63.
86. See statement and testimony of John C.J. Shearer, partner in the firm
of Thos. R. Miller & Son (managers of the United Kingdom Steamship As-
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Each association is made up of shipowners, charterers, and bare-
boat charterers. The association covers its members up to a certain
"retention point." This retention point, beyond which reinsurance
becomes necessary, varies from year to year depending on the
claims experience of the reinsurers. If insurance coverage is de-
sired beyond that point, contracts for reinsurance made with under-
writers each year come into play.87 In the unlikely event that a
loss exceeds both the retention point and the reinsurance, the mem-
bers of the Association can be called upon to meet whatever addi-
tional amount remains uncovered.88
The P & I groups must be distinguished from TOVALOP and its
insurance affiliate, I.T.I.A. TOVALOP was a response by oil com-
panies and tanker owners to the problem of cleanup expenses in-
curred by governments and tanker owners. The P & I clubs, how-
ever, cover all types of liability to third parties. A tanker owner
belonging to both TOVALOP and to one of the P & I clubs would
seem to have double coverage against claims for oil pollution
cleanup. However, I.T.I.A. would be the primary insurer, since
standard marine liability policies contain excess insurance clauses,
89
whereas TOVALOP is silent on the subject of other insurance.
The present cost of adding an oil pollution endorsement to the
general liability package carried by the P & I clubs for coverage
of $20 million is approximately 40 per dwt. ton of crude oil and
50 per dwt. ton of refined oil.90 Thus, the owner of a 20,000 dwt.
surance Association Ltd., largest of the London Protection and Indemnity
Associations), in 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 139 et seq.
87. See statement and testimony of Peter N. Miller, also a partner in
Thos. R. Miller & Son, supra note 86, in 1969 Hearings at 156 et seq.
88. See Healy, supra note 25, at 663-64. A claim for damages would be
paid as follows: 1) the responsible member would pay the claim up to
his deductible, which could reach one million dollars in the case of large,
oil company-owned tankers; 2) the club members, through their P & I as-
sociation, would pay any amounts between the deductible and the retention
point; 3) the reinsurer would pay all sums in excess of the retention point
up to the policy limits, but no more than the legal limit of the shipowner's
liability; and 4) the individual club members could be called upon to meet
any remaining claims beyond the reinsurance coverage.
89. See Bue, Yaka and Jackson: P & I Casualty Insurance; Contractual
Liability, 43 TUL. L. REV. 530, 561 (1969).
90. Much of the material in the text that follows was obtained in three
telephone interviews, October 13 and 14, 1974, with ocean marine experts
of Marsh and McLennan, an insurance brokerage firm [hereinafter cited as
M rsh ?fd McLennan]. Marsh and McLennan is one of the largest broker-
ton tanker would have to pay $800 (or one thousand dollars if he
were carrying refined oil) for one year of oil pollution coverage of
$20 million.
The cost of other liability coverage varies greatly depending on
several different factors. In his testimony before the Senate Sub-
committee on Air and Water Pollution, Paul Kreuzkamp, vice-presi-
dent of an international insurance brokerage firm, gave the follow-
ing example of the different amounts involved:
I have taken the American owner of 10 tankers of 20,000 gross
registered tons in comparison to the foreign owners of similar ton-
nage in relation to limits of liability and premium cost.
I will just take the American owner. Estimated premium of
$60,000 per unit per annum with a limit of liability of $2,500,000,
excess marine insurance of $15 million, with an estimated annual
cost per unit of between $10,000 and $15,000 per unit, which would
produce on a fleet of 10 vessels an annual insurance premium of
$750,000.
The foreign owner: Identical equipment, protection, and indem-
nity insurance of $6,000 premium per unit per year, limit present
time at least $50 million. Ten units cost $60,000.91
Using Kreuzkamp's figures, which are undoubtedly less than the
cost of liability insurance today for tankers, the cost of the oil pollu-
tion endorsement at the rate of 4 per dwt. ton amounts to only
one percent of the total liability premium in the United States;
in foreign countries, only 13%7a% of the total.02 Further, the total
insurance cost-including both hull insurance and liability insur-
ance-amounts to approximately five percent of the operating ex-
pense of a foreign tanker and close to ten per cent for an American
tanker.9 3 Thus, the cost of $20 million of coverage to protect
against oil pollution damage amounts to less than one percent of
the total operating expenses of a foreign tanker; in the United
States, the cost of this insurance amounts to less than one tenth
of one percent of the total operating costs.0 4
Factors Affecting Premiums
Among the factors affecting the overall liability premium of a
age firms dealing in protection and indemnity coverages. As Union Oil
Company's American insurance broker in 1967, Marsh and McLennan han-
dled the insurance on the Torrey Canyon, placing the insurance with some
120 different syndicates and companies. See CowAN, supra note 1, at 96,
98.,
91. 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 158.
92. The computation is as follows: $8000 (cost of oil pollution coverage
for a 200,000 dwt. ton tanker) divided by $750,000 (total insurance pre-
mium) equals .0107, or approximately one per cent. For foreign tankers,
the computation is: 8000/60,000 = 13 1/3%.
93. Marsh and McLennan, supra note 90.
94. 5% of 1% = 1/20th of 1% or .05%; 5% of 13 1/3% = 1/20th of
13 1/3% or .66 2/3%.
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tanker and to some extent, the oil pollution endorsement, are: 1)
the flag of the vessel; 2) prior loss record; 3) operating area; 4)
the rating of the ship; and 5) the limits of liability of the ship-
owner.95
Kreuzkamp's figures imply that the ship's flag-state is probably
the most significant factor in setting the premium for liability in-
surance. In the absence of a treaty or international convention,
the legal liability of the shipowner and his insurer is determined by
the law of the state of registry.96 A country's practice in
awarding large judgments to oil pollution victims will serve to in-
crease premiums paid by tanker owners. On the other hand, a
country which solicits ships to sail under its flag, such as Liberia,
generally has liberal rules of liability favoring the shipowner. In
such cases, insurance premiums are reduced.
97
The prior loss record of a ship and crew and the operating area
of the ship are somewhat less important than the flag-state factor
in determining premiums. A tanker with past losses operating on
busy lanes or docking in heavily-populated areas will, however, pay
a higher premium than a tanker without prior losses, operating on
lightly travelled sea lanes.
A significant element affecting rates, and of great interest to con-
servationists, is the condition or rating of the ship. The ship's rat-
ing or classification is sometimes undertaken by the country under
whose flag the ship is operating. It is most often handled by
Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping of London,
which is the world's largest ship classification society.98 Classifi-
cation is based on a ship's structure and general seaworthiness.
The shipowner warrants that the ship is classified as he represents.
Therefore, if an accident occurs and it is later shown that the ship
was not in as good a condition as its classification indicated, the
95. Marsh and McLennan, supra note 90.
96. See, e.g., article 6(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, providing:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one state only, and save in excep-
tional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in
these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas ....
Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, art. 6, para.
1, 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
97. 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 162.
98. CowAN, supra note 1, at 9.
insurer would be able to escape liability based on breach of war-
ranty.9
9
The classification system promises to be the best means to induce
shipowners to maintain their tankers in the best possible condition.
By making it more costly in terms of higher insurance costs to oper-
ate a faulty and unseaworthy ship than to repair the ship and make
it seaworthy, insurers would provide the incentive to shipowners
to maintain their tankers in good condition. Unfortunately, pre-
mium cost based on classification has not varied enough to make
it worthwhile for tanker owners to repair their ships.100 It is still
cheaper for them to pay the higher premium and leave their ships
in a lower classification than it is to spend the necessary funds to
make their ships more seaworthy and thereby gain a lower pre-
mium.
The premium cost for tanker liability insurance is most directly
affected by the shipowners' limits of liability.10 1 Attempts to in-
crease those limits or remove them altogether have met with re-
sistance from insurers who, as noted, would be exposed to unknown
amounts of liability. This resistance was seen in the 1969 Hearings
before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution involv-
ing two bills prescribing limits of liability for cleanup costs
of $450 per gross registered ton and a total limit of fifteen million
dollars.1
02
It was stated in the hearings that even though the increased lia-
bility of the insurer could be passed along to the insured in the
form of higher premiums, insurers would not write insurance for
the proposed limits.103 Among the reasons given in support of this
99. Marsh and McLennan, supra note 90.
100. As stated in the text accompanying notes 90-91, supra, the cost of
oil pollution coverage is in the vicinity of 4o per dwt. ton for $20 million
of coverage. For a ship as big as the Torrey Canyon, the premium for this
coverage would only amount to about $8,000 per year. Not much repair
work can be done on a $16.5 million ship (what the Torrey Canyon's hull
insurance amounted to-see CowAN, supra note 1, at 98) for $8,000. Thus,
even if the shipowner was to get oil pollution coverage for no charge if
his vessel were in a specified condition, it would not be economically feasi-
ble for him to repair his ship to that condition if such repairs exceeded
$8,000.
101. Marsh and McLennan, supra note 90. In the interview, one of the
brokers stated that if the limits of liability were increased, the cost of oil
pollution insurance could also be expected to increase, though there was
no definite ratio between increasing limits and increasing premium costs.
102. S. 7 and S. 544, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bills sought to
amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. § 466e
(1966).
103. See, e.g., statement of Paul J. Kreuzkamp, vice-president of the in-
surance brokerage firm of Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 1969 Hearings, supra
note 21, at 157 et seq.
[VOL. 12: 717, 1975] Commaents
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
position was that the underwriters had a dearth of data upon which
to base their premiums.104 Underwriters feared that with the
higher limits, their potential liability would exceed their potential
reserves, because they had little idea of the frequency or remedial
costs involved in oil spills and could not gauge their premiums ac-
cordingly.105
Another basis expressed in the hearings for the underwriters' re-
luctance was that along with increased limits of liability, the bills
sought to make shipowners absolutely liable for cleanup ex-
penses.106 The practical effect of holding a shipowner absolutely
liable has been said to shift the burden of proof of the origin of
the oil from the claimant to the vessel owner. 0 7 Only if the ship-
owner could prove that the oil came from another ship could he
escape liability under an absolute liability standard. However, sim-
ilar results could exist if a negligent standard-which was favored
by insurers-and principles of res ipsa loquitur were used. In both
cases, the shipowner has the burden of proof. Under absolute lia-
bility, he must show that the oil came from another ship; under
res ipsa loquitur, he must disprove -his negligence. Since many
spills are caused by untraceable negligence in the mainten-
ance of the ship or in the transporting of the oil from the ship
to harbor facilities, a shipowner's usual means of rebutting the pre-
sumption of negligence is to prove that the oil came from another
ship, 08 as with absolute liability.
Underwriters' opposition to absolute liability, however, was not
based on any unjustified fear of increased liability for oil pollution
damage under an absolute liability standard. The insurance indus-
try argued that if absolute liability were imposed on shipowners
104. 1969 Hearings at 153. Another reason for the reluctance was that
insurers do not like to be overexposed on any one risk. See 1969 Hearings
at 140 for a list of the risks insured against.
105. Id. at 153. The two bills before the Senate would have increased
the underwriters' and shipowners' liability by seven times in cases involv-
ing ships of less than 33,000 dwt. tons. ($450/$67 - 7).
106. See S. 544, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(e) (2) (1969), reprinted in
1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 19.
107. See Becker, supra note 66, at 669-70.
108. See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FoRD. L. REv. 155, 176-
181 (1968). When there is an oil discharge whose cause "cannot be deter-
mined, proof of actual negligence by the plaintiff as a prerequisite to re-
covery is unnecessary in either case. All that must be shown is that the
oil came from the defendant-shipowner's vessel to have liability assessed
under either the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or the rules of absolute liabil-
ity.
for oil pollution damage, it might be imposed with respect to other
risks. The opinion of James J. Reynolds, President of the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping, was representative of the insurance
industry on this topic in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution:
If the concept of absolute liability is imposed for oil pollution,
then I can well imagine the maritime unions shortly coming in and
demanding absolute liability for injury or death of a member of
the crew, regardless of his own conduct; absolute liability for cargo
damage, absolute liability for third parties for property damage,
et cetera.'o9
Congress eventually passed the Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970 and the Water Pollution Control Act of 1971 with a modi-
fied standard of absolute liability. 10 ' The opposition to the stan-
dard proposed in the bills"' presumably had some effect, however.
Unlike the standard proposed in the bills, the Water Quality Im-
provement Act and Water Pollution Control Act relieve a ship-
owner of liability if he can prove that the oil spill resulted from
an act of God, an act of war, third-party negligence, or negligence
of the government.
The limits of liability of the shipowner and his insurer for oil
pollution damage have not changed from the conventions and legis-
lation proposed in the 1969 to 1971 period. In the United States,
liability limits are presently $100 per gross registered ton for cleanup
costs up to a $14 million total, while liability to third persons is
limited to the value of the ship and cargo after the incident." -"
TOVALOP limits are also $100 per gross registered ton, but only
provide a maximum of $10 million. Also, TOVALOP will only in-
demnify national governments for cleanup costs." 3 The Civil Lia-
'bility Convention, although not as yet operative, has proposed
limits of $134 per gross registered ton with a maximum of approxi-
mately $14.1 million, covering both cleanup expenses and liability
for damages to third persons."14
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS OF TANKER Om, POLLUTION
A practical and equitable means of distributing the risk of oil
pollution would be to remove all limits of liability for cleanup
109. 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 1446.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(f) (1) (1970).
111. See S. 7, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(d) (1) (1969), reprinted in 1969
Hearings, supra note 21, at 8-9.
112. See notes 22-29 and accompanying text, supra.
113. See notes 60-65 and accompanying text, supra.
114. See notes 37-45 and accompanying text, supra.
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costs, while retaining present limits for private, third party dam-
ages. All cleanup expenses should be paid for in full by the ship-
owner and his insurer before any third party claims are compen-
sated. Shipowners should be required to carry insurance in a-
mounts which would fully compensate for potential cleanup ex-
penses, based on the true cost of cleanup and not on any artifically-
created figures as now exist. Third party claims should be limited
by the value of the shipowner's interest in the cargo and vessel.
Third party claims which are unsatisfied by the shipowner or his
insurer may be remedied by the International Compensation Fund,
which should be enlarged to meet the increased potential of dam-
ages resulting from the new supertankers.
Third Party Damages
The measure of damages to third persons is too uncertain to act
as a basis for proposing new limits of insurance coverage for oil
pollution. Unlike cleanup costs, there is great variance in per-ton
amounts of damages when private property is involved. As no-
ted,11 the Maine spill of thirty-two tons of oil created claims of
$70 million. Yet, in another spill near Avocat Rock involving
twenty thousand tons of oil, only $28,000 in claims were filed and
paid.116 It would be too burdensome on shipowners to require
them to carry insurance based on such extreme cases as the Maine
spill, when their liability often will not exceed the Avocat Rock
figure.
If such a requirement were placed on shipowners, insurance
would be virtually impossible to obtain for large tankers due to
the amounts involved.117 Even if it could be obtained, premium
costs would undoubtedly be prohibitive. Absent insurance avail-
ability, sources of capital to finance shipping ventures would un-
doubtedly dry up, since the risk for huge losses such as the Maine
oil spill would stay with the shipowner and his backers.
115. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text, supra.
116. 1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 142.
117. If required coverage were based on the per-ton damage figures of
the Maine oil spill, the amount would be tremendous for a 100,000 dwt. ton
tanker. The computation is as follows: the per-ton damage figure was
70,000,000/32 or approximately $2.07 million; multiplying this figure by
100,000 would equal $200 billion, hardly a realistic figure upon which to
base insurance.
For these reasons, present limits based on the value of the ship-
owner's interest in the ship and cargo should be maintained. For
third party claims which go unsatisfied, claimants may look to the
International Compensation Fund when it becomes operative.
CRISTAL is much too restricted in its claims policy to serve as
a vehicle for compensation, 118 and it should be replaced by the In-
ternational Compensation Fund as soon as possible. Since the In-
ternational Compensation Fund will be supported by contributions
from the oil companies, justice will be served in that the parties
owning the oil will be the ones paying for the damage caused by
their product.
Cleanup Costs
Cleanup costs should be the sole burden of shipowners and their
insurers. From a purely practical standpoint, placing the burden
of cleanup costs on the shipowners and not on the oil companies
will presumably result in shipowners taking the initiative in clean-
ing up spills themselves in order to minimize their liability. This
theory underlies the tanker-indemnification provision in TOVA-
LOP, and it appears to be working.1 9
Since shipowners should be required to carry insurance to cover
total potential liability for cleanup costs, it would be necessary to
arrive at a per-ton figure of cleanup costs. The per-ton figure used
in the bill before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pol-
lution was $450.120 The rate was computed by taking the cost of
chemicals needed to disperse one ton of oil.
The figure of $450 is inapplicable today for two reasons. First,
and most importantly, the chemicals traditionally used to clean up
oil have been found to be harmful to marine organisms, and thus
are no longer used in many parts of the world.' 2 ' Secondly, other
techniques have been developed which are more effective than the
chemicals, but also much more expensive. 22 The present cost of
oil cleanup in the United States is said to be at least $7,000 per
ton. 28 This figure represents the average cost for cleanup of oil
118. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text, supra.
119. See Becker, Vehicles for Reimbursement of Oil Pollution Damage,
9 HousTON L. REv. 669, 670 (1972).
120. S. 544, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(e) (1) (1969), reprinted in 1969
Hearings, supra note 21, at 19.
121. This information was obtained in a telephone interview on Oct. 12,
1974, with Captain Richard Johnston (Ret.), chief engineer with Submarine
Engineering Associates, Inc. This company is a San Diego firm specializing
in oil spill containment systems and marine consulting and engineering.
122. Id.
123. Id. Using the figure of seven thousand dollars per dwt. ton, a ship
of 50,000 dwt. tons could generate a potential cleanup cost of $350 million.
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spills which affect beaches and port facilities. Presumably the cost
would drop to some extent if the spill were out at sea, thereby in-
volving no cleanup of other ships, beaches, or terminal facilities.
24
Premiums would, of course, be subject to adjustment depending on
where the ship was to operate. However, since a tanker could not
predetermine where an accidental oil spill might occur, the maxi-
mum figure should apply.
If shipowners were required to obtain insurance based on a figure
of $7,000 multiplied by the number of tons of oil to be transported,
one might expect underwriters to walk away from any such de-
mand, due to their past reluctance to insure pollution risks for $450
per ton. However, the past five years have brought a radical
change in the outlook of marine insurers. 25 The Torrey Canyon
disaster is now considered by the insurance industry as only a "par-
tial loss" when compared to the liability claims paid out since
then. 26 Hull insurers who would have laughed at a request for
$50 million in hull insurance on a tanker five years ago now write
such insurance for $150 million and more.
197
As noted, reluctance on the part of underwriters to accept pro-
posals for increased limits of liability had arisen soon after the Tor-
rey Canyon disaster. Underwriters were in a state of turmoil at
A ship of 200,000 dwt. tons could generate potential cleanup costs of $1.4
billion. Such cleanup expenses are not unrealistic, especially when consid-
ering a spill in a busy harbor or resort beach. In such a case, the oil would
have to be removed from virtually all property at some cost, rather than
be allowed to dissipate on its own over a period of several months.
It is further believed that liability insurance can be obtained for such
amounts. Soon after passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, the Water Quality Improvement Syndicate was formed to provide the
required insurance. The syndicate was made up of 27 American marine
insurers. If a similar syndicate were formed by reinsurers throughout the
world to underwrite these new liability proposals, insurance could conceiv-
ably be made available for the new supertankers at the proposed rates. If
it could not be made available, then an incentive would arise to switch back
to smaller tankers which could be insured at the proposed rates. Since
much of the problem in the first place is based on the increasing size of
tankers, incentives to use smaller vessels would also help to prevent such
disasters as the Torrey Canyon.
124. However, the savings involved where there is no cleanup of port
facilities or ships in port might be eroded with the increased costs of trans-
porting the oil spill containment equipment out to sea.
125. Marsh and McLennan, supra note 90.
126. Id.
127. Id.
that time. Cleanup claims for the Torrey Canyon had amounted
to far more than any other claim on record. In fact, a total of
twenty-nine oil pollution damage claims had been filed with the
four largest P & I associations between 1960 and 1966, and the com-
bined total of all such claims amounted to less than one third of
the Torrey Canyon settlement between Union Oil and France and
Britain.1
28
Since Torrey Canyon, however, insurers have handled many simi-
lar oil pollution damage claims. With an increase in data on the
type of risk involved, expertise in rating tankers has been deve-
loped. No longer are underwriters fearful that their potential lia-
bility might exceed their reserves. Therefore, an adjustment in the
amount of insurance required to be carried should not meet with
nearly the opposition that such an increase faced in the 1969 Senate
hearings. In fact, since liability insurance is nearly always a profit-
able area in an insurer's group of coverages, an increased amount
of insurance would probably be welcomed by the insurance indus-
try.
In contrast, the shipping industry could be expected to oppose
a cancellation of their limited liability for cleanup expenses. How-
ever, their premium for oil pollution liability has amounted to, at
the most, only one per cent of their total operating costs.'20 Raising
their insurance costs to meet the realities of present-day cleanup
costs should not disrupt their operations. First dollar coverage for
liability insurance is, of course, more expensive than last dollar cov-
erage. 930 Thus, an adjustment of coverage based on cleanup costs
of $7,000 per ton certainly would not amount to a ten- or twenty-
fold increase in premium. Even if the premium for oil pollution
liability insurance were to double or triple, such an increase would
not be onerous in light of the relatively small amount being paid
today.: 3' Cost increases could also be passed along to the oil com-
panies, and ultimately, the consumer, so that the shipowner would
not have to bear the burden alone.
Implementation
Increased liability could readily be implemented by amending the
128. The Torrey Canyon settlement was for more than $7.2 million. See
notes 2-3 and accompanying text, supra. The total amount for the 29 claims
was 869,652 pounds or $2,435,025.
129. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text, supra.
130. An example of this is that $20,000 of auto liability insurance costs
considerably less than twice the cost of $10,000 of coverage.
131. It must be added that most damage claims in the past have been
settled for considerably less than the statutory or convention limits. See
1969 Hearings, supra note 21, at 140, 184.
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legislation and international conventions now in existence. Since
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972132 deals only
with cleanup costs, these suggestions could be incorporated into
that legislation by simply deleting the stated limits of liability. The
Civil Liability Convention could also be easily changed by restrict-
ing its application to cleanup expenses and deleting the prescribed
limits of liability.133 These changes, coupled with existing pro-
visions in the convention and legislation, would mean that a ship-
owner would be required to carry insurance based on present costs
of cleanup of $7,000 per ton, rather than the artificially low limits
in the various provisions now in effect. Further, the International
Compensation Fund is set up to apply to all claims which are un-
satisfied by the Civil Liability Convention scheme. Since no private
property damage claim would be satisfied by the Civil Liability
Convention if the proposed changes were made, these claims would
automatically fall within the scope of the Fund. Coverage by the
Fund would therefore exist without having to amend its draft con-
vention.
V. CoNCusIoN
The potential amounts of money involved in oil spills in terms
of cleanup expenses and third party damages have risen to astrono-
mical figures in light of increases in the size of supertankers. As
more and more reliance on Middle Eastern oil continues, shipment
of oil in supertankers will surely increase. As illustrated by the
Torrey Canyon spill, possible losses from a supertanker breakup can
run into the tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars.
Liability of the shipowner for these losses has traditionally been
confined to an artificial limit having little relationship to the actual
damage involved. Although the purpose for the limitation of lia-
bility principle-encouraging investment in a risky venture-still
exists, present liability limits favor the shipowner at the expense
of the potential victim far too much.
A reasonable and easily-implemented reform for meeting the in-
creased potential liability is to delete all liability limits presently
applied to cleanup costs and make shipowners liable for all such
expenses without a limit. The right to limit liability should apply
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. 1973).
133. Civil Liability Convention, art. 7.
only insofar as private property claims are concerned. Private pro-
perty claims could be handled by such funds as the International
Compensation Fund.
Shipowners should be obligated to carry insurance in amounts
reflecting the total potential cost to clean up their cargo. The
worldwide insurance market has the capacity and the will to indem-
nify shipowners for the complete cost of cleanup. The premium
for increased insurance should not become prohibitive, especially
in light of the relatively miniscule amounts now being paid for such
insurance.
Rather than the individual governments and private parties bear-
ing the burden of cleanup expenses in excess of present limits of
liabilty, the worldwide insurance market can indemnify against
such losses. Since the risk of loss for cleanup costs would be shifted
to insurers, and with limits still applicable to private property dam-
age claims, investors would be protected against huge amounts of
liability. More importantly, governments and individuals would no
longer have to bear the burden of unsatisfied claims. The cost of
oil pollution would thus be borne more equally by all the parties
who benefit from the shipment of oil-the shipping industry, in the
form of higher premiums; the oil companies, in the form of higher
shipping costs; and of course, the consumer, in the form of higher
prices for petroleum products.
CHAnEs F. GoRIA
